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APPLICATION OF THE CORPORATE
NEGLIGENCE DOCTRINE TO MANAGED
CARE ORGANIZATIONS: SOUND PUBLIC
POLICY OR JUDICIAL OVERKILL?
Emmanuel 0. Iheukwumere*
INTRODUCTION
In the past, physicians, in their sole discretion, usually determined
courses of treatment for their patients and insurance companies paid the
charges.! However, with the emergence of the health maintenance
organization (HMO) as part of the managed care organization (MCO)
system, which is not only a force to be reckoned with but also the
dominant system in health care delivery,2 the physician's role has been
* Eaton & McClellan, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. B.A., summa cum laude,
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dedicate this article to my siblings, Emeka, Prince, Ugochi and Chioma, and to my
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Prof. Frank M. McClellan of Temple Law School, and Allen T. Eaton for giving
me a better appreciation for medical malpractice and products liability litigation.
I also thank all my colleagues at Eaton & McClellan, both in the Philadelphia and
Washington, D.C. offices. I am grateful to my dear friend Prof. Philip Aka of
Chicago State University, and Craig L. Thorpe, Esquire for reviewing the earlier
draft. Lastly, I am greatly indebted to the editorial staff of this journal,
particularly Richard Weinblatt, for their superb editorial assistance.
1. See Frank J. Vandall, An Examination of the Duty Issue in Health Care
Litigation: Should HMOs Be Liable in Tort for "Medical Necessity" Decisions?, 71
TEMP. L. REV. 293, 298 (Summer 1998).
2. Domenick C. DiCicco, Jr., Symposium: Pursuing Health in an Era of
Change: Emerging Legal Issues in Managed Care: HMO Liability for the Medical
Negligence of Member Physicians, 43 VILL. L. REV. 499 (1998). There appear to
be three models of HMOs. These include the staff, independent practice
association (IPA) and group models. Under the staff model the HMO employs
physicians and other health care providers such as nurses and technicians on a
salary basis, provides the facilities where care is rendered and furnishes the
necessary equipment. Under the IPA model, the HMO contracts with
independent physicians who own their own offices and provides the facilities and
equipment needed for administering treatment. In return for their services to the
HMO subscribers, the HMO pays the IPA physicians a predetermined amount,
called a capitation fee, per month for each subscriber who selects the IPA as his or
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largely relegated to recommending a course of treatment. This transition
ultimately leaves to MCOs, through their utilization review process
(UR),3 the ultimate decision of whether or not a treatment should be
rendered.4 In light of the power and influence of MCOs in medical
decision making, courts have imposed vicarious liability upon MCOs
when their conduct has been deemed negligent and has resulted in harm
to patients.5 Some courts have gone as far as allowing claims of MCO
corporate negligence that are based on negligent selection and retention
6
and negligent implementation of cost containment procedures to
proceed.7 Other courts have endorsed, although not applied, the
corporate negligence doctrine to MCOs.8 In 1998, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court, in Shannon v. Healthamerica,9 expressly applied the
her primary care physician. This procedure is followed regardless of how many
times during the month the IPA actually treats the subscriber. Finally, under the
group model, the HMO contracts with physician groups that agree to provide care
to the HMO's subscribers. See, e.g., Chase v. Independent Practice Ass'n, Inc.,
583 N.E. 2d 251, 252 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991); Mark G. Cooper, Comment: A "New"
Approach to Medical Malpractice: The Liability of HMOs for Member Physician
Negligence, 1994 DET. C.L. REV. 1263, 1263-65 (1994). It is, however, imperative
and urged that the application of labels to HMO models be carefully considered in
light of the difficulty inherent in precisely typecasting an HMO. Id.
3. See, e.g., James Bartimus & Christopher A. Wright, HMO Liability: From
Corporate Negligence Claims for Negligent Credentialing and Utilization Review to
Bad Faith, 66 UMKC L. REV. 763, 770 (1998) (defining utilization review as the
"process by which an HMO determines if medical services requested or
proscribed by a primary care physician are appropriate and necessary").
4. See Vandall, supra note 1, at 298.
5. See, e.g., Shannon v. Healthamerica Pa., Inc., 718 A.2d 828 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1998) (holding that an HMO may be vicariously liable for the negligent conduct of
its triage nurses who provided improper medical advice to a subscriber over the
telephone and failed to timely refer her for needed care); Petrovich v. Share
Health Plan of Ill., 696 N.E.2d 356 (I11. App. 1998), appeal granted, 705 N.E.2d
448 (I11. 1.998) (holding that an HMO may be held vicariously liable for the
conduct of its participating physicians where its representations leads the
subscriber to look up to it as the provider of medical care and injury results, citing
Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)).
6. See, e.g., Herrera v. Lovelace Health Sys., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1327
(D.N.M. 1999).
7. See Mark Zamora, Medical Malpractice and Health Maintenance
Organizations: Evolving Theories and ERISA's Impact, 19 NOVA L. REV. 1047,
1055 (1995).
8. See, e.g., Raglin v. HMO Illinois, Inc., 595 N.E. 2d 153 (I11. App. 1992);
Petrovich v. Share Health Plan, 696 N.E. 2d 356 (II1. App. 1998).
9. 718 A.2d 828 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
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corporate negligence doctrine to an HMO for negligent medical advice
offered by the HMO's triage nurses to a subscriber over the telephone.
This article will analyze Shannon and other recent rulings that show a
willingness to impose direct liability upon MCOs for negligent medical
care. This article will examine whether an extension of the corporate
negligence doctrine to MCOs, in view of the job MCOs have done in
reducing the rampaging cost of health care, 10 constitutes sound public
policy or merely judicial overkill. This article concludes that sound public
policy requires the extension of the corporate negligence doctrine to
MCOs. Such an extension will ensure that MCOs will act reasonably in
their dealings with patient-subscribers, who have already lost substantial
control over the amount and quality of care they receive.
I. THE ERA OF MEDICAL CAVEATEMPTOR: CHARITABLE AND
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR HOSPITALS
Imagine this scenario. On September 14, 1960, a patient goes to her
local community teaching hospital for treatment. While at the hospital a
student nurse negligently injects her with a medication, resulting in
paralysis of her left leg and toe, attended by severe pain and suffering.
Seeking justice in the form of monetary compensation for her injury, the
patient, now a plaintiff, sues the hospital for the negligence of the student
nurse. In response, the hospital files a motion for summary judgment,
claiming the defense of charitable immunity. Undaunted by the motion,
the injured patient places her hope on the trial judge to do justice. To her
surprise, the trial judge grants the motion. Certainly, the trial judge was
mistaken in his interpretation of the law, plaintiff surmises. On appeal
plaintiff receives another shock: the trial judge was right. The defense of
charitable immunity shields the hospital from responsibility for the
12negligent conduct of the student nurse.
Most people would react viscerally to the above scenario without an
explication of the charitable immunity doctrine that until recently
shielded hospitals from tort liability for the negligent conduct of their
agents and/or ostensible agents. Beginning with the seminal case of
10. See infra note 52.
11. Caveat emptor is a Latin term which summarizes the maxim that the
purchaser of goods must judge for himself and buy at his own risk. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, 22 (6th ed. 1997). In the medical context, the term meant that the
patient received treatment from an institution enjoying either charitable or
sovereign immunity at his or her own risk.
12. See Cibor v. Oakwood Hosp., 165 N.W. 2d 326 (Mich. App. 1968).
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McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital," the doctrine of charitable
immunity descended on the common law of the United States. 4 The
charitable immunity doctrine considered hospitals to be charitable
institutions, and accordingly exempted them from the general rule holding
a corporation liable for the negligent conduct of its servants, employees
and/or agents. 5 Hospitals not protected by charitable immunity were
generally protected from liability under sovereign immunity, 6 a relic from
the English common law, which states employed to insulate their agencies
from tort liability.1
7
With the protection of charitable and sovereign immunities, hospitals
had no real incentives to ensure patient safety. Courts adopted legal
fictions such as the borrowed servant doctrine to afford patients a
modicum of protection from the negligent conduct of hospital employees
and agents.' Under the borrowed servant doctrine, a surgeon was
deemed to have borrowed the hospital's nurses and other support staff
during surgery, and was held responsible for their negligent conduct.' 9
The borrowed servant doctrine later gave rise to the captain of the ship
doctrine." Under the captain of the ship doctrine, the surgeon was held
vicariously liable for the conduct of others in the operating room where
the surgeon is the individual with the highest authority.' During the era
13. 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
14. See, e.g., Garlington v. Kingsley, 289 So. 2d 88, 90-92 (La. 1974)
(overruling several intermediate appellate court holdings which had upheld the
charitable immunity doctrine in Louisiana, and harshly criticizing the rationale
behind the doctrine).
15. See Roger N. Braden & Jennifer L. Lawrence, Medical Malpractice:
Understanding the Evolution-Rebuking the Revolution, 25 N. Ky. L. REV. 675, 678
(1998); see also Ellen Wertheirmer, Calabresi's Razor: A Short Cut to
Responsibility, 28 STETSON L. REV. 105, 122 (1998) (observing that the basic
premise of tort law is that everyone should be responsible for his or her negligent
conduct).
16. See Braden & Lawrence, supra note 15, at 678.
17. See, e.g., C.E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY 5 (1972) (observing that the sovereign immunity doctrine emanated
from the English rule that the king can do no wrong).
18. Braden & Lawrence, supra note 15, at 679.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Monk v. Darner, 403 F.2d 580, 583 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (declaring
that the fact that the nurse is under the doctor's supervision and acts under his
orders as to some matters does not make her his agent for all purposes. On the
other hand, his supervision of specific conduct of the nurse can make her his agent
at the same time that she is the agent of the hospital (emphasis added).); Szabo v.
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of unbridled charitable and sovereign immunities, an injured patient's
only recourse was against the treating physician individually. However, if
the physician was not insured and had no personal assets that a prevailing
injured party could reach upon securing a judgment, the injured party and
his or her lawyers were left without a remedy.
Courts began to abrogate the doctrines beginning with the Rhode
Island case of Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital,22 and extending from the
1940s 23 through the 1970s,24 due to the horror stories accompanying
application of the charitable 25 and sovereign immunity doctrines. By 1971,
all but three states, Maine, New Mexico and South Carolina, had
26repudiated the doctrine of charitable immunity completely.
Bryn Mawr Hosp., 638 A.2d 1004, 1006 (Pa. Super. 1994) (noting that "[u]nder the
'Captain of the Ship Doctrine' a surgeon is liable for all negligence which causes
harm to his patient in the operating room in which the surgeon is the person of the
highest authority."); Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191, 1194 (4th Cir. 1989) (applying
Virginia law, holding that according to settled state law Dr. Bulala may, under the
evidence in this case, be vicariously liable for the negligence of the hospital
nurses).
22. 12 R.I. 411 (1879).
23. See, e.g., President & Dir. of Georgetown Coll. v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810
(D.C. Cir. 1942).
24. See, e.g., Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E. 2d 3 (N.Y. 1957); Collopy v. Newark
Eye & Ear Infirmary, 141 A.2d 276 (N.J. 1958). But see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-
7 to -11 (2000) (reinstating a modified form of charitable immunity which provides
that non-beneficiaries of the concerned charity may recover in tort from it). See,
e.g., Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 28 (1960); Hungerford v. Portland
Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n, 384 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Or. 1963); Flagiello v.
Pennsylvania, 208 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1965); Adkins v. St. Francis Hosp. of Charleston,
143 S.E.2d 154, 162 (W. Va. 1965); Myers v. Drozda, 141 N.W.2d 852 (Neb. 1966);
Rabon v. Rowan Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 152 S.E.2d 485 (N.C. 1967); Abernathy v. St.
Mary's Hosp., 446 S.W.2d 599, 606 (Mo. 1969); Garlington v. Kingsley, 289 So.2d
88, 93 (La. 1974); Brown v. Anderson County Hosp. Ass'n, 234 S.E.2d 873, 875-
877 (S.C. 1977).
25. See, e.g., Iterman v. Baker, 15 N.E.2d 365, 367 (Ind. 1938).
26. See Brown, 234 S.E.2d at 875 (quoting Prosser & Keaton, PROSSER &
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 133 (4th ed. 1971)). This statement should not
be taken to mean that the doctrine of charitable immunity is dead. On the
contrary, the doctrine still retains some viability in one form or another in some
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Schultz v. The Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark, 472
A.2d 531 (N.J. 1984); Harrell v. Total Health Care, Inc., 781 S.W.2d 58 (Mo.
1989).
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II. THE RISE OF MCOs
In 1927, in the small town of Elk City, Oklahoma, an enterprising
physician established a medical cooperative for about 6000 farm workers.
This medical cooperative planted the seed for the present system of
27MCOs by developing the concept of a prepaid health plan. By the 1930s,
the concept had gathered momentum, leading to the establishment of the
modern MCO by the Kaiser industries for the benefit of its large
construction workforce. 28 Apparently perceiving the MCO as a threat to
the ability of physicians to charge what they pleased and to practice
medicine as they saw fit, the American Medical Association (AMA)
waged a pitched battle against the growth of MCOs in the 1930s by• 29
labeling the concept as socialized medicine or communism, fully aware
of the hostility such labeling would invite during the peak of the Cold
War. The AMA did not stop at mere labeling, but undertook a vigorous
campaign to stop this "corporate practice of medicine"3 ° and to ensure
that hospitals denied privileges to physicians affiliated with or employed
by MCOs.31  For example, a local medical association stripped
membership from a physician employed by the Sears Roebuck
32employees' health care plan. The medical association, taking its cues
from the AMA, contended that the physician's reduced rate on services to
employees' family members was unethical and conflicted with the practice
of fellow physicians in private practice. 3  The AMA's campaign against
one such MCO, the Group Health Association (GHA), a prepaid
cooperative association of government employees in Washington, D.C.,
drew the attention of the Department of Justice (DOJ).34 The DOJ
27. See, e.g., DiCiccio, supra note 2, at 500.
28. See Vernellia R. Randall, Managed Care, Utilization Review, and
Financial Risk Shifting: Compensating Patients for Health Care Cost Containment
Injuries, 17 PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1, 21, n.79 (1993).
29. Id. at 20.
30. See Brian P. Battaglia, The Shift Toward Managed Care and Emerging
Liability Claims Arising from Utilization Management and Financial Incentive
Arrangements Between Health Care Providers and Payers, 19. U. ARK. LI'rLE
ROCK L. J. 155,159 (1997).
31. Id. at 161.
32. Id. at 159-60. Battaglia observed that "[t]he medical profession viewed
company controlled medicine with suspicion and viciously attacked the
entrepreneurial physicians who were creating cooperatives or entering into
prepaid agreements with employee groups or employers." Id. at 159.
33. Id. at 159-60.
34. Apparently, the AMA "carried out a course of conduct intended to
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brought indictments against the AMA and others for antitrust violations,
predicated on restraints of trade and commerce in the District of
Columbia.3' The indictments ultimately resulted in convictions." The
convictions, however, did not stop AMA opposition to MCOs.
Notwithstanding the AMA's hostility to the early MCOs, the concept
continued to grow in the 1940s and the 1950s, resulting in the formation of
MCOs such as the Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound and the
Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York.37 Despite MCOs' attempts
to grow in the face of AMA opposition and restrictive state statutes,
HMOs numbered less than forty by 1972, with about three million
enrollees.
3 8
In 1973, in reaction to increases in the cost of health care, Congress
provided great impetus to the growth of MCOs by passing the Health
Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 (HMO Act).39 The HMO Act not
only provided grants for the development of HMOs, but also subsidized
their initial operating losses.40 The result was impressive. By 1988, the
number of MCOs had risen to about 648, and enrollment had climbed to
approximately thirty-one million.4 ' The cost of health care had reached
an astounding twelve percent of all consumer spending by 199042 and an
alarming fourteen percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) by 1992
while approximately thirty-five million people still remained without
health insurance.4' As a result of this dramatic increase in health care
costs, MCO enrollment climbed to about fifty-six million in 1995 " and to
an estimated enrollment of sixty
45 to seventy-seven million by 1997.46
prevent GHA from securing and retaining the services of qualified physicians or
using hospital facilities in the District of Columbia." Id. at 161.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. DiCicco, supra note 2, at 501.
38. Id. at 502-03.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-4 (2001).
40. Id.
41. Randall, supra note 28, at 21.
42. See Vandall, supra note 1, at 294.
43. Id. at 296; see also Perez v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 1999 N.J. LEXIS 1000 (N.J.
Aug. 9, 1999) (observing that health care is the single largest business in the
United States, representing 14% of the gross domestic product, and consuming
the single largest amount of non-governmental spending). In addition, Perez
noted that Americans spent more than $1 trillion on health care products and
services in 1996 alone. Id.
44. See Bartimus & Wright, supra note 4, at 763.
45. Id.
2001]
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MCO enrollment continues to grow and had been projected to reach well
over one hundred million by the year 2000.4
MCOs not only increased enrollment at impressive rates over the years,
but also parleyed their newfound power and influence into provider
contracts with more than seventy-five percent of practicing physicians.48
41MCOs are not merely insurers, but are also providers of health care.
When several studies in the 1980s questioned the propriety of certain
medical procedures that involve substantial expense," MCOs bypassed
the traditional insurance industry's deference to the judgment of the
physician" and established the UR system. MCOs employ the UR to
46. See Braden & Lawrence, supra note 16, at 686.
47. See, e.g., DiCicco, supra note 2, at 500; Bartimus & Wright, supra note 4,
at 763 (noting that "several estimates place HMO enrollment by the year 2000 at
over 100 million members"). Although this projection may be off by a small
margin due to recent decreases in HMO enrollment, there is reason to be believe
that enrollment in HMOs will continue to increase over the next several years.
See HMO enrollment declines, MEDICAL MARKETING & MEDIA (Aug. 1, 2000)
(reporting results of a study showing that for the first time total enrollment in
HMOs have fallen, resulting in a total enrollment of 80.1 million as of July 1,
1999). But see Employers See 100% M+C Premium Hikes; HMOs Still a Deal; But
at Breaking Point, MANAGED CARE & MEDICAID (Aug. 7, 2000) (noting
likely increases in health care insurance premiums, but observing that employers
are still likely to keep pushing employees into HMOs due to escalating
prescription drug costs).
48. See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Price, The Evolution of Health Care Decision-
Making: the Political Paradigm and Beyond, 65 TENN. L. REV. 619, 621 (1998)
(observing that by 1996 "over eighty percent of doctors had signed contracts with
managed care organizations"); Braden & Lawrence, supra note 16, at 686 (noting
"[b]y 1993, the number of physicians participating in or affiliated with HMOs had
increased to 75%").
49. See Vandall, supra note 1, at 296 (describing an HMO as "a large group of
consumers who are now able to buy large volumes of medical care for less" and
noting that the reason for the HMO's influence is its ability to pull together all the
diverse financial interests of its members into a viable economic bargaining power
"with the monopolistic health care industry"). See also, DiCicco, supra note 2 and
accompanying text for additional definitions of an HMO.
50. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall & Gerard Anderson, Health Insurers' Assessment
of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1652-53 (1992) (describing studies
questioning the appropriateness of several medical procedures routinely ordered
by physicians and other studies finding a wide variation in hospital admission rates
across geographic areas which could not be explained by either demography,
health or economic status or other relevant factors).
51. See, e.g., Vandall, supra note 1, at 298; Margaret Gilhooley, Broken Back:
A Patient's Reflections on the Process of Medical Necessity Determinations, 40
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determine whether a particular medical procedure recommended by the
treating physician is medically necessary. 2 The UR typically involves a
prospective review, which includes precertification, concurrent review of
length of hospitalization, second opinion requirements for surgical
procedures and management of expensive procedures. 3 The UR also
includes retrospective review, which includes analysis of data on hospital
admissions, patterns of treatment and utilization of certain procedures to
identify instances of overutilization. During the precertification stage,
MCO employees or agents screen a requested admission to a medical
facility to assess the necessity of admission." Concurrent review involves
VILL. L. REV. 153, 161-62 (1995) (observing that due to the differences of medical
opinions on the need for a particular medical procedure, insurers traditionally
deferred to the opinion of the treating physician, even when the procedure was
expensive).
52. Bartimus & Wright, supra note 4, at 770 (defining.utilization review).
Medical necessity, which is the benchmark of HMO UR, is normally described in
the typical HMO contract as follows: "[T]he service is (a) ordered by a doctor. (b)
is commonly and customarily recognized throughout the doctor's profession as
appropriate in the treatment of the sickness or injury. (c) is neither educational
nor experimental in nature nor provided primarily for research purposes." Hall &
Anderson, supra note 50 (citing Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp.
131, 134 (D.N.J. 1989)). See Mark A. Hall & Teresa Rust Smith, et al., Symposium
on Consumer Protection in Managed Care: Mechanics of Consumer Protection-the
Marketplace and Regulation: Judicial Protection of Managed Care Consumers: An
Empirical Study of Insurance Coverage Disputes, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1055,
1055-56 (1996) (noting that both private and public insurance, such as Medicare
and Medicaid, typically describe medical necessity as medically appropriate). "It
excludes experimental care, nonstandard treatments, treatment without any
known benefit, and treatment such as cosmetic surgery not intended to correct or
relieve a medical condition." Id.
53. Hall & Anderson, supra note 50, at 1653.
54. Randall, supra note 28, at 27.
55. See Hall & Anderson, supra note 50, at 1654. The authors described a
typical precertification UR as follows:
The insurance contract requires the subscriber or physician, except in
emergencies, to obtain permission before entering the hospital or
undergoing certain expensive outpatient procedures. The treatment
request is usually reviewed initially by a computer algorithm that flags
certain requests for further clinical review. Then a nurse, applying fairly
rudimentary screening criteria, reviews these cases to determine which
ones require further physician review. Physician reviewers, who rely on
published studies of medical effectiveness as well as their own clinical
experience, then apply their independent judgment of medical
appropriateness, usually after consulting with the treating physician in
2001]
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the MCO's determination of the necessity of the patient's continued
hospital stay.56
UR accomplished the MCO's health care reduction goal5 7 by cutting
18costs substantially over the years. Abuses of the process accompanied
the success of the UR system. In some instances, MCO reviewers became
obsessed with costs to the detriment of the patient, failing to accord
proper respect to the opinions of treating physicians.' 9 The age-old
tension between MCOs and physicians reappeared with UR, which overly
focused on the profit motive. Glaring instances of negligent URs
resulting in injuries to patients6° prompted judicial, legislative and
cases of disagreement. In most such cases, the two doctors reach some
accord.
Id.
56. Randall, supra note 28, at 34.
57. See, e.g., Vandall, supra note 1, at 310 (observing that "[t]he historical
basis of the HMOs and the key to their success is cost containment. HMOs exist
because they brought the explosive escalation of medical expenses to a halt.");
David Kline, Affairs of State: HMOs Are Losing the Battle of Public Opinion,
CAPITOL NEWS SERVICE, at 9 (Jan. 13, 1998) ("HMOs were designed to cut costs,
pure and simple. They are able to do so by purchasing in volume and by
tightening control to combat doctors' urges to order unnecessary tests or pills").
Id.
58. See, e.g., Christine C. Dodd, Note, The Exclusion of Non-Physician Health
Care Providers from Integrated Delivery Systems: Group Boycott or Legitimate
Business Practice?, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 983, 986 (1996) (observing that UR allows
HMOs to reduce costs over conventional plans by ten to forty percent); Vandall,
supra note 1, at 294, n.9 (observing that it has been predicted that HMOs will save
Americans up to $383 billion this decade alone).
59. See, e.g., Dukes v. U.S. Health Care, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995)
(providers, acting on MCO UR guidelines, failed to perform necessary and
relatively inexpensive blood tests ordered by patient's primary care physician,
resulting in clearly avoidable death of patient); Corcoran v. United Health Care,
Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992) (MCO failed to honor obstetrician's
recommendation that patient with high risk pregnancy be hospitalized, and
instead, assigned a day nurse to be with patient 10 hours a day. During assigned
nurse's off duty baby went into fetal distress and died); Wickline v. State of
California, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1986) (MCO's refusal to approve an eight-day
extension requested by attending physician for hospitalized patient led to a chain
of events resulting in the avoidable amputation of the patient's leg).
60. See infra note 62; see also Alex Rodriguez, Council panel hears HMO
horror stories; Proposed law would impose reforms within city, CHIC. SUN-TIMES,
Apr. 9, 1997, at 24 (reciting a patient's ordeal with her MCO, and an attempt by
the City of Chicago City Council to pass an ordinance regulating the conduct of
HMOs operating within the City); NOT BOTH WAYS; HMOs cannot direct care
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scholarly re-examination of whether and how MCOs should be held liable
for their negligent conduct.
61
III. EXEMPTION OF MCOs FROM LIABILITY - SELECTED CASES
With the abrogation or modification of charitable immunity, many
jurisdictions began holding hospitals accountable in tort for the negligent
conduct of their employees, agents, or ostensible agents on theories of
vicarious liability6" and corporate liability. 63 In the landmark case of Bing
v. Thunig,64 the New York Court of Appeals made a poignant statement
yet refuse responsibility, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 26, 1996, at A18 (outlining
disturbing practices by HMOs, which include, among others, requiring the
performance of mastectomies on an outpatient basis, and contractually imposing
gag rules which limit the ability of physicians to discuss treatment alternatives with
patients); Jane Nelson, HMO allegations show why reforms are needed, THE FORT
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 26, 1997, at 15 (recounting HMO horror stories
which convinced the writer, a Republican State Senator, to introduce a bill
regulating the conduct of HMOs in Texas); Tom Kelly, HMO Excesses Have
Spurred Backlash, Regulation, FORT LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 29, 1996,
at A27 (observing that in 1996 alone more than one thousand pieces of legislation
were introduced to regulate or curb the conduct of HMOs, resulting in the passage
of fifty-six new laws in thirty-five states).
61. See, e.g., Dukes v. U.S. Health Care, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995);
McClellan v. HMO PA, Inc., 604 A.2d 1053 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Raglin v. HMO
Ill., 595 N.E.2d 153 (Ill. App. 1992); Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d
1321 (5th Cir. 1992); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 20A.14 (1997); Vandall, supra note
1; DiCicco, supra note 2; Battaglia, supra note 34. The concern about MCO
practices has even convinced the House of Representatives to pass a measure
dubbed the Patients' Bill of Rights in October 1999, which would give patients the
right to sue MCOs, particularly HMOs, when their actions negligently result in
injury.
62. See supra notes 24-26 and 28; see also Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp.,
287 Pa. Super. 364, 430 A.2d 647 (1980) (noting that it would be unfair to require
an injured patient to be familiar with the law of respondeat superior and to
inquire of each person who treated him or her whether the individual is employed
by the hospital). In addition, Capan held that a hospital may be held vicariously
liable for the negligent conduct of an independent contractor physician if the facts
show that the injured patient looked to the hospital rather than the individual
physician for care, and that the hospital held out the physician as its employee
such as when "the hospital acts or omits to act in some way which leads the patient
to a reasonable belief he is being treated by the hospital or one of its employees."
Id. at 649.
63. See Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem. Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (I11. 1965);
see also cases cited infra note 71.
64. 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
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about the duty of courts to protect the innocent patient who seeks
treatment from a hospital. The court stated that "the conception that the
hospital does not undertake to treat the patient, does not undertake to act
through its doctors and nurses, but undertakes instead simply to procure
them to act upon their own responsibility, no longer reflects the fact.
65
Seizing on this idea, in Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial
Hospital,66 the Illinois Supreme Court became the first appellate court to
impose corporate liability upon a hospital for its negligent failure to
61ensure the safety of the patient while in the hospital. Soon the doctrine
became an emerging trend when several jurisdictions adopted it.68 In
Thompson v. Nason Hospital,69 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court traced
the origin of the corporate negligence doctrine, set forth explicit and well-
reasoned rationales for application of the doctrine to hospitals and laid
down the most concise and definitive description of a hospital's duties to a
patient under the doctrine."
Coincidentally, although most courts were imposing liability upon
65. Id. at 8.
66. See Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 253.
67. See, e.g., Bost v. Riley, 262 S.E. 2d 391, 396 (N.C. App. 1980) (noting
"[t]he proposition that a hospital may be found liable to a patient under the
doctrine of corporate negligence appears to have its genesis in the leading case of
Darling v. Hospital"); Bartimus and Wright, supra note 4, at 765 (observing "[t] he
doctrine of corporate negligence was first imposed against hospitals in the
landmark case of Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital").
68. See, e.g., Purcell v. Zimbelman, 500 P. 2d 335 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972); Bost,
262 S.E.2d at 396; Insinga v. Labella, 543 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1989); Thompson v.
Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991).
69. 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991).
70. Thompson v. Nason Hospital first adopted the corporate negligence
doctrine in Pennsylvania holding that the hospital is liable under corporate
negligence if it fails to uphold the proper standard of care owed the patient, which
is to ensure the patient's safety and well-being while at the hospital. This theory
of liability creates a non-delegable duty that the hospital owes directly to the
patient. Therefore, the injured party does not have to establish the negligence of
a third party.
Further, Thompson set forth four distinct duties of hospitals with regard to patient
care as follows:
(1) a duty to use reasonable care in the maintenance of safe and adequate
facilities and equipment; (2) a duty to select and retain only competent
physicians; (3) a duty to oversee all persons who practice medicine within
its walls as to patient care; and (4) a duty to formulate, adopt and enforce
adequate rules and policies to ensure quality care for the patients.
Thompson, 591 A.2d at 707 (citations omitted).
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hospitals under both vicarious and corporate liability theories, horror
stories of the negligent conduct of MCOs began to catch the attention of
the public." Even though MCOs participate in patient's health care•• 72 •• 73
decisions and actively intervene between the doctor and the patient, the
early decisions on MCOs exempted them from liability.74 In two of those
cases, the California Court of Appeals and the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals handed down opinions that absolved MCOs of liability for
negligence in overruling the medical judgments of patients' treating
physicians.
In Wickline v. California,7' a California appellate court absolved an
MCO of liability, holding that the patient's treating physician was solely
responsible for the harm that she had suffered. There, Lois J. Wickline, a
medical assistance recipient, went to her primary care physician (PCP),
Dr. Stanley Z. Daniels, a general family practitioner, with complaints of
back and leg pains. Dr. Daniels put Mrs. Wickline through a physical
therapy regimen. When her condition did not improve, Dr. Daniels had
her admitted to Van Nuys Community Hospital for treatment.
Subsequent to her admission, Dr. Daniels brought into the case Dr.
Gerald E. Polonsky, a surgeon specializing in peripheral vascular surgery.
Dr. Polonsky examined the plaintiff and diagnosed her condition as
Leriche's Syndrome.
Given the advanced stage of Mrs. Wickline's illness, Dr. Polonsky
performed a major surgical operation, involving the removal of a part of
her artery and the insertion of a teflon graft in its place. Later, on the
same day, Mrs. Wickline developed a clot on the graft, necessitating a
second surgery to remove the clot. The second surgery took place within
hours of the initial surgery. Her post-operative recovery was described as
71. See cases cited supra note 61.
72. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Rose & Katherine S. Somervell, Claims Against
Managed Care Organizations, HEALTH L. LITIG. REP. (Oct. 1999); see also Pegram
v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000) (emphasizing "the physicians through whom
HMOs act make just the sorts of decisions made by licensed medical practitioners
millions of times every day, in every possible medical setting").
73. See, e.g., Joshua Michael Kaye, Closing the Lid on Pandora's Box: ERISA
Preemption of Tort Actions Against Managed Care Organizations in State Courts,
54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 373, 376 (Jan. 2000).
74. See, e.g., Ellen Wertheimer, Calabresi's Razor: a Short Cut to
Responsibility, 28 STETSON L. REV. 105, 106 (Summer 1998) (observing that "the
law applicable to HMOs began not with the extension of liability to HMOs, but
with an exemption from liability").
75. 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630 (1986).
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"stormy, ' '16 with incidents of severe spasms and hallucinations. 77 Due to
the intensity of the spasms, Dr. Polonsky performed a third surgical
procedure, known as a lumber sympathectomy, which involved the
surgical removal of a chain of nerves lying on each side of the spinal
column. The chief of surgery at the hospital, Dr. Leonard Kovner,
assisted Dr. Polonsky with all three surgeries.
Mrs. Wickline was scheduled to be discharged five days following the
last surgery. However, the day before her scheduled discharge, Dr.
Polonsky and other physicians determined that it was medically necessary
to keep her in the hospital for an additional eight days, citing the risks of
infection and/or clotting. Hospital personnel subsequently filed the
necessary request for extension with the MCO, Medi-Cal, owned by the
state of California.
Upon receiving the request for extension, a Medi-Cal "on-site nurse,"
with the authority to wholly, but not partially, approve the request,
determined that eight additional days were unnecessary. Consistent with
the UR procedure in place, she contacted a Medi-Cal board-certified
general surgeon, Dr. William S. Glassman. Dr. Glassman had no
specialization in peripheral vascular surgery. Apparently, without
examining any of the available documentary information about Mrs.
Wickline, 7 Dr. Glassman denied the eight-day extension request, but did
grant four additional days. Further, Dr. Glassman did not discuss Mrs.
Wickline's case with either the PCP or the attending surgeon nor did he
consider the determinative signs and symptoms in arriving at his decision.
Compounding the cycle of patient neglect, neither the PCP nor the
surgeons pressed the issue of the full extension of hospitalization. Mrs.
Wickline was discharged at the end of the additional four days, over her
personal protest. The surgeons' fears materialized when she developed
severe infections and clotting on the graft of the operated leg that were so
serious that they resulted in her emergency admission nine days later.
Attempts to save her leg proved futile, resulting in an amputation initially
below the knee, and then above the knee.
Mrs. Wickline and her husband brought suit against Medi-Cal, charging
that its refusal to grant the full extension was the proximate cause of her
injury. 9 The plaintiffs prevailed at the trial court level. On appeal, the
court appropriately observed that the risks associated with the
76. Id. at 1635.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1638. The basis for this conclusion is that Dr. Glassman testified he
had no recollection of reviewing any information on Mrs. Wickline's case. Id.
79. Id. at 1633.
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prospective UR were much higher than those associated with the
retrospective UR, because the former puts increased pressure on
practitioners to sometimes withhold necessary medical treatment while
the latter may only result in denial of payment for services rendered. 8°
The court then considered the then existing California Civil Code § 1714,
81which provided for liability on each tortfeasor for its negligent conduct.
The court reversed the judgment, holding that the MCO "did not override
the medical judgment of Wickline's treating physicians at the time of her
discharge.""'
Disregarding its own statement that "[t]hird party payors of health care
services can be held legally accountable when medically inappropriate
decisions result from defects in the design or implementation of cost-
containment mechanisms,, 83 the court took comfort in its finding that the
treating physicians did not protest the halving of the extension request,
thus placing sole responsibility for the plaintiffs' injuries on the
physicians.
The problem with the court's reasoning was its classification of the
MCO as a mere third party payor."' MCOs, as previously indicated, are
more than third party payors.86 MCOs involve themselves in the medical
treatment of their subscribers and actively intervene between patients and
doctors."' The Medi-Cal MCO was no different. It reviewed the treating
physicians' medical decisions and determined the appropriate
hospitalization stay under the circumstances. It did not merely decide
80. Id. at 1634.
81. Id. at 1643.
82. Id. at 1646. The court's conclusion appears troubling at best. The treating
physicians medically determined that the patient's condition warranted eight days
additional in-patient hospitalization. The MCO, acting through its employees and
agents, clearly overrode this medical decision by insisting that, under the
circumstances, four additional days were sufficient.
83. Id. at 1645.
84. Id. The court reasoned:
[T]he physician who complies without protest with the limitations
imposed by a third party payor, when his medical judgment dictates
otherwise, cannot avoid his ultimate responsibility for his patient's care.
He cannot point to the health care payor as the liability scapegoat when
the consequences of his own determinative medical decisions go sour.
Id.
85. See id.
86. Vandall, supra note 1, at 296.
87. Rose & Somervell, supra note 72; Kaye, supra note 76, at 376.
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issues of payment, as would a mere third-party payor.8
In the wake of Wickline, the Fifth Circuit decided Corcoran v. United
Healthcare, Inc."" According to the court, the facts in this case were
undisputed.9 Plaintiff Florence Corcoran became pregnant with her
second child. Her obstetrician considered her pregnancy high risk, based
on the documented history of fetal distress that accompanied her first
pregnancy (a view shared by a second-opinion obstetrician retained by
Bell). 9' Therefore, he recommended and sought precertification for her
hospitalization from United Healthcare, the MCO charged with
administering the UR aspect of her employer's self-funded welfare benefit
plan.
Despite the recommendation of the treating physician, and the
apparent concurrence of the independent obstetrician retained by the
employer,92 United Healthcare denied authorization for hospitalization.
Instead, it authorized ten hours of home nursing care per day. When no
nurse was on duty, the fetus experienced distress and died. 93 Mr. and Mrs.
Corcoran filed a wrongful death action in Louisiana state court against
United Healthcare and Blue Cross, which was also involved in the
administration of the plan. The lawsuit alleged that United Healthcare's
decision that Mrs. Corcoran "did not require hospitalization during the
last month of her pregnancy," was an erroneous medical decision.94 The
defendants removed the action to the federal court on the grounds of
alleged ERISA preemption and complete diversity of citizenship.
Subsequently, the defendants filed motions for summary judgment,
alleging that the plaintiffs' action was really a claim for damages for
"improper handling of a claim from two entities whose responsibilities
were simply to administer benefits under an ERISA-governed plan."95
The court granted summary judgment. The court appears to have
88. Rose & Somervell, supra note 72 (observing that traditionally, third party
payors such as insurance companies "simply issued reimbursement checks on
proof that medical bills have been incurred by an insured").
89. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
90. Id. at 1.322.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. Id. at 1324.
94. Id. at 1330. The Corcoran's argued that "they are not advancing a claim
for improper processing of benefits. Rather, they say, they seek to recover solely
for United's erroneous medical decision that Mrs. Corcoran did not require
hospitalization during the last month of her pregnancy." Id.
95. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1325.
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agreed with the defendants' contentions and subscribed to an overly
expansive reading of the ERISA preemption clause.96 It held that since an
ERISA plan was the source of the relationship between the defendants
and the plaintiffs, the claim was related to ERISA, and was therefore
preempted. On appeal, the plaintiffs only pursued United Healthcare.98
Observing that the potential liability of MCOs was only in its infancy,
the court conceded that Louisiana law was unclear on the viability of
plaintiffs' theory of recovery.99 Although the court agreed that United's
decision on benefits due under the applicable plan involved a medical
determination, 1° it concluded that the language of ERISA was broad
enough to preempt the plaintiffs' cause of action. 01 Notwithstanding its
recognition that "imposing liability on United might have the salutary
effect of deterring poor quality medical decisions, '' the court declared
itself hamstrung by what it considered the significant risk that "state
liability rules would be applied differently to the conduct of utilization
review companies in different states," resulting in increased costs
associated with maintaining UR programs.103
The court concluded that ERISA compelled a result that deprived the
plaintiffs of a remedy under federal and state tort law for what the court
96. The statutory ERISA preemption clause relied upon by the defendants
and the District Court, Section 514(a), contained in 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2001),
provides in relevant part:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this
title and title IV shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in
section 4(a) [29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)] and not exempt under section 4(b) [29
U.S.C. § 1003(b)].
97. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1325.
98. Id. at 1326.
It is evident that the Corcorans no longer pursue any theory of recovery against
Blue Cross. Although they mention in their appellate brief the fact that they
asserted a claim against Blue Cross, they challenge only the district court's
conclusion that ERISA pre-empts their state law cause of action against
United.
Id.
99. Id; at 1328.
100. Id. at 1332. "In our view, United makes medical decisions as part and
parcel of its mandate to decide what benefits are available under the Bell plan."
Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1333.
103. Id.
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considered a potentially serious medical mistake.' 4  The court's
conclusion can be ascribed to its overriding concern for uniformity 0 5 and
for the potential increase in cost to MCOs in the event of non-application
of preemption."'
Corcoran assumed that Congress was so concerned with ensuring the
survival of plan funds that it overlooked the traditional role of states in
the regulation of professional malpractice in enacting section 514 of
ERISA 1 07 The problem with the court's approach is that section 514 of
ERISA is silent on any Congressional intent to preempt the role of states
in the regulation of the quality of medical care.'() Notwithstanding the
court's assertion that its holding was consistent with the expressed
104. Id. at 1338. "The result ERISA compels us to reach means that the
Corcorans have no remedy, state or federal, for what may have been a serious
mistake." Id.
105. Id. at 1333 (emphasizing "although imposing liability on United might
have the salutary effect of deterring poor quality medical decisions, there is a
significant risk that state liability rules would be applied differently to the conduct of
utilization review companies in different states") (emphasis added, internal citation
omitted). The court's position was indeed ironic since it acknowledged that
ERISA has the purpose of "safeguarding the interest of employees." Id. at 1338.
It is therefore difficult to comprehend why the concern for uniformity was allowed
to trump any considerations of the employee's interests. Certainly, plan
beneficiaries have an interest in receiving quality care, whether in the form of
actual medical treatment or advice, which is deserving of substantial consideration
in the preemption analysis, especially where the care provider hides behind the
preemption argument to escape liability for its arguably negligent conduct.
106. Id. at 1333 (emphasizing "[tihe cost of complying with varying
substantive standards would increase the cost of providing utilization review
services, thereby increasing the cost to health benefit plans of including cost
containment features such as the Quality Care Program").
107. Id. "[I]t is foreseeable that state courts, exercising their common law
powers, might develop different substantive standards applicable to the same
employer conduct, requiring the tailoring of plans and employer conduct to the
peculiarities of the law of each jurisdiction. Such an outcome is fundamentally at
odds with the goal of uniformity that Congress sought to implement." Id. (emphasis
added).
108. See, e.g., Dukes v. U.S. Health Care, 57 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 1995)
(noting that "[q]uality control of benefits, such as the health care benefits
provided here, is a field traditionally occupied by state regulation and we interpret
the silence of Congress as reflecting an intent that it remain such"); see also
Pegram, 530 U.S. 211 (noting that "in the field of health care, a subject of
traditional state regulation, there is no ERISA preemption without clear
manifestation of congressional purpose," citing New York State Conference of
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654-55 (1995)).
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intention of Congress when it enacted ERISA,1 9 nothing in the statutory
preemption clause of ERISA, section 514(a), or in the civil enforcement
provision of ERISA, section 502, "0 makes clear that state tort actions
premised on the negligent medical decisions of a plan administrator are
preempted.
One may wonder why ERISA preemption is so significant. The answer
is that the remedies available under ERISA are woefully inadequate to
address the compensatory needs of a patient injured through negligent
medical care. The civil enforcement provision of ERISA, section 502(a),
only provides a plan beneficiary with three remedies: A civil action to (1)
recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan; (2) enforce his
rights under the terms of the plan; or (3) clarify his rights to future
benefits under the terms of the plan. The civil enforcement provision fails
to mention the negligent provision of medical care either directly or
indirectly." In the face of preemption, an injured party's only recourse
would be to file suit to recover benefits due him or her under the plan,
such as the right to medical treatment. However, what benefit would such
recovery have, since the party is already injured on account of medical
negligence? Such a recovery will not compensate for losses on account of
the negligent care, i.e., pain and suffering and lost income. Alternatively,
a plan beneficiary could bring a legal action to compel the plan
administrator to continue authorizing benefits under the plan or to
reimburse for costs incurred, or an equitable action such as a declaratory
judgment action or injunction to clarify his or her rights for future benefits
under the applicable plan. However, as mentioned before, such actions
would not address the compensatory needs of the injured party.
109. See Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1339 (observing, "we acknowledge our role
today by interpreting ERISA in a manner consistent with the expressed intentions
of its creators").
110. The civil enforcement provision of ERISA, section 502(a), provides in
pertinent part that a participant or beneficiary of an employee benefit plan may
bring a civil action "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future
benefits under the terms of the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000).
111. See, e.g., Dukes, 57 F.3d at 357.
[A] claim about the quality of a benefit received is not a claim under § 502
(a)(1)(B) to "recover benefits due.., under the terms of [the] plan....
[A] suit "to recover benefits due under the terms of [the] plan" is
concerned exclusively with whether or not the benefits due under the
plan were actually provided. The statute simply says nothing about the
quality of benefits received.
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Attorneys for MCOs, who were fully aware of the limited remedy
available under the enforcement provisions of ERISA in comparison to
what may be obtained under a state tort action, advise:
It should be the goal of every defense attorney in a health
coverage matter to persuade the court that the plaintiff's state
law claims are preempted by ERISA. The benefits of this
strategy are clear: claims under ERISA are limited to
reimbursement for medical care received or other equitable
relief (no compensatory damages, no punitives), and there is no
jury trial."
Perhaps cognizant of this fact, and unwilling to give section 514(a) the
sweeping preemptory effect Corcoran adopted, some federal and state
cases decided subsequent to Corcoran have disagreed with that court's
approach and have repudiated Corcoran's holding and rationale. 3
112. Rose & Somervell, supra note 72, at 18.
113. See, e.g., Blaine v. Community Health Plan, 687 N.Y.S.2d 854 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1998) (tort action alleging that HMO's employees negligently failed to timely
diagnose and properly treat patient's back problem, resulting in a discectomy not
preempted under ERISA); Dukes, 57 F.3d at 357 (finding the absence of
preemption under ERISA where state tort action alleged negligent provision of
medical care). "We find nothing in the legislative history suggesting that Section
502 was intended as a part of a federal scheme to control the quality of the
benefits received by plan participants." Id. In addition, Dukes stressed "[q]uality
control of benefits, such as the health care benefits provided here, is a field
traditionally occupied by state regulation and we interpret the silence of Congress
as reflecting an intent that it remain such." Also, see the following cases holding
that the companion federal Act, the Medicare Act, does not preempt state tort
actions where the claims are based on the quality of care rendered: McCall v.
Pacificare of Cal., 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1999) (tort action
premised on HMO and primary care physician's unreasonable delay in making a
referral to a specialist for the treatment of progressive lung disease, resulting in
the worsening of patient's condition, not preempted under the Medicare Act);
Plocica v. Nylcare of Tex., 43 F. Supp. 2d 658, 664 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (claim based
on HMO's unreasonable interference with and/or termination of psychiatric care
of patient, leading to patient committing suicide, not preempted under the
Medicare Act); Ardary v. Aetna Health Plans of Cal., Inc., 98 F.3d 496, 501 (9th
Cir. 1996) (state wrongful death action against private Medicare provider not
seeking recovery of Medicare benefits, but seeking compensatory and punitive
damages for the provider's alleged negligent denial of emergency medical services
and misrepresentation not preempted under Medicare Act). Justifying its holding,
Ardary noted that the "removal of the right to sue the private Medicare provider
for its torts would result in an inequitable and substantial dilution of the rights of
patients." 98 F.3d at 501.
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IV. APPLICATION OF VICARIOUS AND DIRECT LIABILITY ON MCOs
- SELECTED CASES
Wickline, Corcoran and other cases'1 have declined to hold MCOs
liable for their negligent medical decisions resulting in injuries to patients.
However, opinions from the California court that decided Wickline"5 and
courts in Indiana,1 6 Illinois," 7 New Jersey,1  Pennsylvania" 9 and Ohio'
have held MCOs liable under various tort theories.
r 121
In McClellan v. HMO PA, Inc., for example, the Pennsylvania
114. See also Williams v. Good Health Plus, 743 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. App. 1987)
(sustaining the grant of summary judgment to the defendant HMO on the ground
that HMO could not practice medicine, and was thus not liable for negligence of
member physician resulting in surgical removal of patient's thumbnail).
115. See Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 878 (Cal. App. 2d
Dist. 1990) (distinguishing Wickline and reversing the trial court's grant of
summary judgment to the defendant HMO).
116. Sloan v. Metro-Health Plan, 516 N.E.2d 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987)
(reversing summary judgment and holding that HMO defendant may be held
vicariously liable for the negligent conduct of its physician).
117. Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Ill., 696 N.E.2d 356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)
(reversing summary judgment and holding that a triable issue of fact existed as to
whether plaintiff-patient's treating physicians were the apparent agents of the
defendant HMO); Raglin v. HMO Ill., Inc., 595 N.E.2d 153, 156 (Il. App. Ct.
1992) (holding that an HMO may be held liable under ostensible agency,
respondeat superior, and corporate negligence).
118. Dunn v. Health Care Plan of N.J., 656 A.2d 413 (N.J. 1995) (affirming
judgment against HMO defendant on respondeat superior grounds and
emphasizing that an HMO may be held liable under the corporate negligence
theory for negligent selection and negligent UR, and additionally, that liability
may be based on breach of contract or warranty).
119. Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)
(reversing a grant of summary judgment and holding that HMO defendant may be
held liable under the ostensible agency doctrine); McClellan v. HMO PA, Inc., 604
A.2d 1053 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (reversing the sustaining of defendant HMO's
preliminary objections in the form of a demurrer, and holding HMO may be held
liable under ostensible agency theory, for negligent selection and retention of
primary care physician, for misrepresentation, and may be assessed punitive
damages if facts at trial show reckless indifference to the safety of the patient).
For an extended analysis of punitive damages under Pennsylvania law, see
Emmanuel 0. Iheukwumere, Punitive Damages in Pennsylvania: Is Gross
Negligence Enough?, 69 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 180 (Oct. 1998).
120. Williams v. Healthamerica, 535 N.E.2d 717 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987)
(vacating summary judgment and holding that a triable issue of fact existed
regarding whether HMO breached its contract with patient).
121. 604 A.2d 1053 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). Four years prior to McClellan the
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Superior Court confronted the issues of ostensible agency, corporate
negligence, breach of contract, breach of warranty and intentional
misrepresentation or fraud." After acknowledging that the managed care
system indirectly provides diminished compensation to physicians who
123deem additional medical care necessary or desirable, the court declared
itself precluded by constitutional mandate from deciding whether such a
system violated public policy. It opined that such a determination was
within the purview of the legislature.2 4 The plaintiff's primary factual
allegation was that the primary care physician removed a suspicious
looking mole from the back of the decedent and discarded it instead of
submitting the mole for a biopsy or other histological examination as the
standard of care required. The plaintiff alleged that the failure to submit
the mole for testing prevented a timely diagnosis of the decedent's cancer,
resulting in metastasis and death.
The court reversed the trial court's grant of defendants' preliminary
objections, and held that sufficient facts existed regarding the liability of
the defendant HMO under the ostensible agency theory of negligence by
125its participating primary care physician. In addition, the court held that
the facts pleaded in the complaint were sufficient to withstand demurrers
to plaintiff's allegations of misrepresentation based on representations by
the HMO and breach of contract. On the question of corporate
negligence, the court held "[i]t would appear unnecessary ... to extend
the theory of corporate negligence to IPA model HMOs in order to find
that such HMOs have a non-delegable duty to select and retain only
competent primary care physicians."'27 Significantly, this was one of the
duties that Thompson v. Nason placed on hospitals under the corporate
negligence doctrine."' Unwilling to expressly extend the Thompson v.
Nason doctrine of corporate negligence to HMOs in this opinion, the
McClellan Court relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 323
same court became the first court to extend the ostensible agency doctrine from
the hospital setting to the MCO setting. Boyd, 547 A.2d at 1229. See Joshua
Michael Kaye, Comment, Closing the Lid on Pandora's Box: ERISA Preemption
of Tort Actions Against Managed Care Organizations in State Courts, 54 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 373, n.170 (Jan. 2000).
122. 604 A.2d at 1056.
123. Id.
124. Id. n.6.
125. Id. at 1058.
126. Id. at 1060-61.
127. Id. at 1059.
128. Id. In addition, see Thompson v. Nason, 591 A.2d 703, 706-707 (1991).
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in holding that the HMO had a duty to select and retain only competent
physicians.9
In Jones v. Chicago HMO,30 the Illinois Appellate Court considered
issues of first impression under Illinois medical malpractice jurisprudence.
These included whether an HMO may be held liable under the corporate
negligence doctrine and breach of contract. 3 On January 18, 1991,
plaintiff's three month old daughter developed a loss of appetite,
abnormal sleep patterns, fever, constipation and became prone to
excessive crying. In response plaintiff called her HMO PCP, Dr. Robert
Jordan. Unable to reach him, plaintiff related her daughter's symptoms to
the nurse in Dr. Jordan's office. The nurse advised the plaintiff to give
the infant some castor oil. Later, Dr. Jordan returned the plaintiff's call
and echoed the nurse's castor oil recommendation. The infant's
condition did not improve, prompting the plaintiff's visit to the emergency
room with her daughter the next day. At the ER the infant was admitted,
and later diagnosed with bacterial meningitis. The infant suffered
permanent brain damage as a result of the meningitis."'
The plaintiff then filed suit against the HMO seeking to hold the HMO
liable under corporate negligence, vicarious liability and breach of
129. McClellan, 604 A.2d at 1059. The court emphasized:
We find that the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to state a cause of
action for negligence in the selection, retention, and/or evaluation of the
primary care physician. Since Section 323 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts has long been part of the law of this Commonwealth, we need
not now consider or decide whether the theory of corporate negligence is
applicable to IPA model HMOs.
Id. (citations omitted). Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 323 provides in
pertinent part:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the
other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his
undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon theundertaking.
Id.
130. 703 N.E.2d 502 (I11. App. Ct. 1998), affd in part, and rev'd in part, 730
N.E.2d 1119 (I11. 2000).
131. Id. at 504. "Until now, no Illinois medical malpractice case has dealt with
claims of HMO independent corporate negligence and breach of contract with
covered patients." Id.
132. Id. at 507.
133. See id.
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contract. Deposition testimony revealed that the HMO, which both sides
conceded was an IPA model HMO,14 assigned the PCP to the plaintiff
and specifically referred to subscriber PCPs as "your Chicago HMO
personal doctor," in its handbook.13 - Deposition testimony also showed
that the HMO had the right to review the PCP's medical decisions and to
terminate his contract if his practices did not comport with the HMO's
guidelines. At the end of discovery, the trial court granted the HMO's
motion for summary judgment on all three theories of liability. On
appeal, the appellate court observed that "[n]o Illinois case has held an
HMO can be liable for an injury to the plan's patient on a theory of
independent corporate negligence., 136  The court also noted that
"Petrovich and Raglin make passing reference to the viability of such a
theory, but they did not decide the issue." 3 1 It also cited two cases from
other jurisdictions, McClellan and Harrel v. Total Health Care, Inc.'38
Those cases held that an HMO may be held liable under the corporate
negligence doctrine for negligent UR and/or failure to conduct reasonable
investigation of the qualifications into its participating physicians. 139
Observing that HMO liability based on corporate negligence was "new
ground... fraught with considerations of public interest, matters that
courts are ill-equipped to determine,"'' 40 the Jones Court affirmed
summary judgment on corporate negligence and breach of contract.
However, it reversed on vicarious liability, holding that a question of fact
existed regarding the ostensible agency liability of the HMO for any
proven negligence of the PCP, based on the HMO's aggressive marketing
• • 141
and representations to the plaintiff. The Illinois Supreme Court then
reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the HMO with
respect to the corporate negligence claim. The court's decision was based
on the conclusion that public policy militated against allowing HMOs to
assign more patients to a primary care physician than the physician is
capable of handling, when it is reasonably forseeable that such excessive
134. For a description of the different HMO models, see supra note 3.
135. See Jones, 703 N.E.2d at 507.
136. Id. at 508.
137. Id.
138. 781 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1989).
139. Ironically, Harrel v. Total Health Care, Inc. essentially affirmed the grant
of immunity to an MCO for the negligent conduct of a participating physician,
based on a state statutory provision allegedly exempting non-profit MCOs from
liability for the negligence of independent licensed physicians. Id. at 61.
140. Jones, 703 N.E.2d at 509.
141. Id. at 511.
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assignment could result in injury to the patients.1
Finally, in Shannon v. Healthamerica,43 Pennsylvania became the first
jurisdiction to hold a managed care plan directly liable for its own
independent corporate negligence. The evidence in Shannon showed that
Mrs. Shannon, a subscriber of the HMO, Healthamerica, selected Dr.
Larry P. McNulty as her obstetrician/gynecologist during her first
pregnancy from a list supplied by Healthamerica.1 " The HMO
membership card supplied to Mrs. Shannon advised her to call either her
physician or the HMO medical hotline, which was staffed by registered
nurses, if she had any medical questions or in the event of an emergency.
Consistent with this advice, she called Dr. McNulty on October 2, 1992
with complaints of abdominal pain, and scheduled an appointment with
him for October 5, 1992.145 On the day of the appointment, Dr. McNulty
examined her for five minutes and decided that her abdominal pain was
due to a fibroid uterus. 4  He prescribed bed rest and took her off work
for one week. Dr. McNulty did not order any diagnostic tests to confirm
his diagnosis, nor did he advise Mrs. Shannon of the symptoms of preterm
labor."'
In the next four days, Mrs. Shannon called Dr. McNulty at least four
more times with complaints of continuing abdominal pains and explained
to him that she had also developed back pains, constipation and difficulty
sleeping. She inquired whether she was in preterm labor, since her
symptoms were similar to ones described in a reference book she had on
labor. 14 During each call, Dr. McNulty assured her that she was not in
142. See Jones, 703 N.E.2d. at 1134. The Jones court asserted:
we hold that Chicago HMO had a duty to its enrollees to refrain from
assigning an excessive number of patients to Dr. Jordan. HMOs contract
with primary care physicians in order to provide and arrange for medical
care for their enrollees. It is thus reasonably forseeable that assigning an
excessive number of patients to a primary care physician could result in
injury, as that care may not be provided.
Id. The court continued, "Public policy would not be well served by allowing
HMOs to assign an excessive number of patients to a primary care physician and
then 'wash their hands' of the matter. The central consequence of placing this
burden on HMOs is HMO accountability for their own actions." Id. (emphasis
deleted).
143. 718 A.2d 828 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
144. Id. at 831.
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preterm labor and increasingly became impatient and irritated with her
calls. 49  Unable to obtain relief from Dr. McNulty, and sensing his
impatience, she called the HMO hotline and related her symptoms and
the various calls to Dr. McNulty. In response, the HMO's triage nurse
advised her to call Dr. McNulty again. When she called Dr. McNulty
again and indicated that her symptoms were getting worse, he did not
change his medical advice.5 On October 11, 1992, Mrs. Shannon called
the HMO triage nurse again and related Dr. McNulty's failure to respond
to her complaints. Again, the HMO nurse advised her to call Dr.
McNulty. 5' Once more she called Dr. McNulty and related that her
condition had worsened. In addition, she informed him that her legs were
beginning to go numb.112  Dr. McNulty continued to respond with
impatience and angrily asserted that she was not in preterm labor."'
Frustrated with Dr. McNulty's non-responsiveness, Mrs. Shannon
called the HMO's medical hotline on October 12, 1992 and related her
ordeals with worsening symptoms and with Dr. McNulty. 1 4 In response,
one of the HMO's in-house orthopedic physicians spoke with her on the
phone and directed her to go for a back examination at West Penn
Hospital, located about one hour away from her house."' Mrs. Shannon
passed several hospitals on her way to West Penn. At West Penn she was
initially processed for a back examination, based on the instructions from
the HMO's in-house physician, but was admitted to the obstetrical wing as
a formality based on the stage of her pregnancy. 1 6 The same day, she
delivered a baby who died two days later due to severe prematurity. 
157
The Shannons brought suit against the HMO, asserting claims of
vicarious and direct liability under the corporate negligence doctrine.
Plaintiffs alleged that the HMO, through its triage nurses, deviated from
the standard of care by not referring Mrs. Shannon to a hospital for a
pelvic examination and a fetal stress test on October 10 and 11, 1992. In
addition, the Shannons' expert testified that the HMO, through its nurses
and orthopedic physician, deviated from the standard of care on October
12, 1992 by not arranging for immediate hospitalization and examination










of the patient. These acts and omissions, in the expert's opinion,
increased the risk of harm to the baby.""
At the close of plaintiffs' evidence, the trial court granted a compulsory
nonsuit to defendants on both the vicarious and direct liability theories. 9
On appeal, the Superior Court examined the duties set forth under the
corporate negligence doctrine in Thompson v. Nason,'6° and held that the
third duty required by the holding in that case, the overseeing of all
persons who practice medicine within an institution's walls as to patient
care, was applicable. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for a
new trial. The court emphasized that like the Thompson court's
recognition of "the corporate hospital's role in the total health care of its
patients," it too was recognizing the "central role played by HMOs in the
total health care of its subscribers.,
161
The court pointed out the various roles HMOs play in the provision of
care, stressed the helplessness of subscribers in the stewardship of their
care, and noted that while HMOs may not be practicing medicine, "they
do involve themselves daily in decisions affecting their subscriber's
medical care."1 62 More importantly, Shannon held that when an MCO
makes a decision to limit a subscriber's access to treatment, "that decision
158. See id. at 834. For analysis of the increased risk of harm, see, e.g., Hamil
v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978), holding in pertinent part:
Once a plaintiff has introduced evidence that a defendant's negligent act or
omission increased the risk of harm to a person in plaintiff's position, and
that the harm was in fact sustained, it becomes a question for the jury as
to whether or not that increased risk was a substantial factor in producing
harm.
Id. at 1286. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 323(a), which provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services
to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of
the other person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his
undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of
such harm[.]
159. A compulsory nonsuit is a ruling against the party with the cause of
action, usually at the close of that party's presentation of evidence, which indicates
that the party has failed to prove the elements of the controverted action. Under
Pennsylvania law a nonsuit may be voluntary, whereby the plaintiff voluntarily
terminates the action, or compulsory, when the court determines that the plaintiff
has failed to establish a right to relief. See Pa. R. Civ. P. 230 & 230.1. See also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 for the companion federal rule.
160. 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991).
161. Shannon, 718 A.2d at 835.
162. Id.
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must pass the test of medical reasonableness."'' 63 It also stressed that
"when a benefits provider, be it an insurer or a managed care
organization, interjects itself into the rendering of medical decisions
affecting a subscriber's care it must do so in a medically reasonable
manner."'164 In addition, the court held that once Healthamerica provided
a phone service for emergent care staffed by triage nurses, it was under a
duty to ensure that the medical advice dispensed was medically
reasonable. Finally, regarding corporate liability, the court stressed "we
now make explicit that which was implicit in McClellan and find that
HMOs may, under the right circumstances, be held corporately liable for
a breach of any of the Thompson duties which causes harm to its
subscribers.",165
V. APPLICATION OF CORPORATE LIABILITY ON MCOS: SOUND
PUBLIC POLICY OR JUDICIAL OVERKILL?
As discussed above, the Shannon Court was willing to hold managed
care organizations corporately liable. The Illinois Appellate Court in
Jones admonished that courts are ill-equipped to deal with the issue of• •• 166
managed care organization corporate liability. Given these cases, the
issue arises as to whether judicial imposition of corporate liability on
managed care organizations comports with sound public policy or
constitutes judicial overkill.
Direct liability may be imposed on hospitals under the corporate
negligence doctrine for negligent failure to: (a) maintain safe and
adequate facilities and equipment for patients; (b) select and retain only
competent physicians; (c) oversee all persons who practice medicine
within their walls as to patient care; and (d) formulate, adopt, and enforce• 167
adequate rules and policies to ensure quality care for patients. The
decision to impose liability on these theories emanated from the
recognition that hospitals wield substantial influence over their employee
physicians and nurses, and also over those non-employee physicians who
have admitting privileges at hospitals. That decision also recognizes that
when patients go to a hospital, they normally look to the hospital to
ensure their safety and well-being while at the hospital. The hospital in
163. Id. at 835-36.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 836.
166. 703 N.E.2d at 509.
167. See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (Il.
1965); Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991).
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turn acts through its employee physicians and nurses, and others granted
privileges at the hospital, to respond to the reasonable expectations of the
patients.168 The rationale justifying application of corporate negligence to
hospitals is equally applicable to MCOs.
Individuals normally enroll in an MCO with a reputation for qualified
and reputable health care providers, reasonable premiums, and adequate
and timely provisions of care.' 69 In the case of staff model MCOs, which
directly employ physicians and other health care providers to care for
their enrollees, 7" it is clearly reasonable to assume that the enrollees
expect the MCOs to ensure their safety and well-being while receiving
care from those retained by the MCOs. Accordingly, MCOs have the
same obligations as hospitals to select and retain on their enrollment lists
only competent health care providers. They also have the obligation to
maintain safe and adequate facilities and equipment for enrollees when
the MCOs decide to provide direct medical care. Further, the duty to
oversee all who practice under their influence and control should fall on
MCOs, as well as the obligation to formulate, adopt, enforce and insist on
their enrolled providers' formulation, adoption and enforcement of
adequate rules to ensure quality care for enrollees.
Imposition of corporate negligence upon MCOs when supported by
facts is also strongly supported by the widely-accepted premise of tort law
- that everyone must accept responsibility for his or her conduct. 7 ' For
the average patient who suffers an injury as a result of medical negligence,
public policy militates in favor of compensation and restitution, and
against immunity for the responsible MCO. Any assumption that a
corporate entity will act appropriately under the circumstances without
168. See, e.g., Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 4 (N.Y. 1957).
169. See, e.g., David Algeo, Managed care options improve HMOs respond to
customers' demand for access, choice, THE DENVER POST, Mar. 15, 1998, Business
Section, at 25.
170. See supra note 3.
171. See Wertheimer, supra note 77, at 122 (asserting that the basic premise of
tort law is that all members of society should be responsible for compensating
those they injure). It is also instructive to note that a system which allows
managed care organizations to escape liability for their negligent infliction of
injury on subscribers runs the risk of frustrating the noble purposes of tort law.
For the purposes of tort law see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901
(1977) providing in relevant part that the purposes for which actions in tort are
maintainable include: "a) to give compensation, indemnity or restitution for
harms; (b) to determine rights; (c) to punish wrongdoers and deter wrongful
conduct; and (d) to vindicate parties and deter retaliation or violent and unlawful
self-help."
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the threat of tort liability is an illusion. 172 Managed care organizations
deserve commendation for their efforts to rein in the spiraling cost of
health care. 17  MCOs, as their records demonstrate, are essential to
reining in the skyrocketing cost of health care. 174  However, their
remarkable effort in achieving cost containment should not excuse them
from liability when facts show that their medically-related decision
imperiled the life or safety of a patient. Although recent rulings reflect a
developing trend toward disallowing an ERISA preemption defense when
the quality of care provided by an MCO is at issue, 75 courts need to do
172. Id. at 122-23 (stressing that "HMOs like all other entities, need the
incentive of tort liability to encourage them to act reasonably," and observing that
"[p] roviding such an incentive to all participants in society is, indeed, one of the
moving forces behind the adoption of a negligence standard in the first place");
Vandall, supra note 1, at 297 (observing that because HMOs are usually for profit,
their primary obligation may be to represent their shareholders' interest in the
quest for profit).
173. See Vandall, supra note 1, at 294, n.9 (observing that HMOs are
predicted to save Americans about $383 billion in health care costs by end of the
last decade (1999) alone).
174. See Shannon, 718 A.2d at 835.
175. See, e.g., Pappas v. United Healthcare, 724 A.2d 889, 894 (Pa. 1997),
vacated and remanded by United States Healthcare Sys. of Pa., Inc. v.
Pennsylvania Hosp. Ins. Co., 120 S. Ct. 2686 (2000) (allegation that MCO
unreasonably interfered with medical decision regarding which medical facility
was best suited for plaintiff's neurological emergency condition and then
unreasonably delayed authorization for the transfer of plaintiff, resulting in
permanent quadriplegia, not preempted under ERISA, because negligence laws
have "only a tenuous, remote, or peripheral connection with [ERISA] covered
plans, as in the cases with many laws of general applicability," (quoting New York
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co, 514 U.S.
645, 661 (1995)). Although the U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded
Pappas without an opinion, in light of its ruling in Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S.
211 (2000), the U.S. Supreme Court's action neither compels a reversal of, nor
vitiates the holding of Pappas by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Pegram
neither disavowed the Court's own rationale in Travellers, Inc., relied on by
Pappas, nor questioned what appears to be the well-settled rule that regulation of
health care is traditionally a matter of state interest, not subject to ERISA
preemption without clear congressional intent. See Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2158
(emphasizing "in the field of health care, a subject of traditional state regulation,
there is no ERISA preemption without clear manifestation of congressional
purpose"). Further, Pegram, unlike Pappas, was concerned with the issue of
whether "treatment decisions made by a health maintenance organization, acting
through its physician employees, are fiduciary acts within the meaning of ERISA,"
120 S. Ct. at 2147. The question raised in Pappas was whether ERISA preempts a
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more to deter negligent decision making influenced by excessive emphasis
on the bottom line.
Although legislatures play important roles in holding MCOs directly
liable for their negligent acts and omissions, the judiciary has an
obligation to protect the interests of patients."' Unlike MCOs and the
medical profession, patients do not have the ability to strenuously oppose
any legislation adverse to their interests. Patients need the protection of
the courts to ensure that MCOs do not escape liability either through the
invocation of an alleged ERISA preemption clause, or by arguing that
they do not practice medicine when their decisions put patients' health or
life in jeopardy.' In addition to holding MCOs vicariously liable for the
negligent conduct of their employees, agents and ostensible agents, courts
have an obligation to hold them directly liable under the corporate
liability principle when their negligent actions or omissions harm patients.
When MCOs provide health care services or interject themselves into
medical decisions resulting in injuries to patients, sound public policy calls
for the imposition of tort liability to ensure the safety and protection of
patients. Likewise for the corporate hospital, common sense and logic
require the imposition of a non-delegable duty upon MCOs to select and
retain only competent physicians, maintain safe and adequate facilities
and equipment for patient care, oversee all who practice medicine under
their direction, and formulate, adopt and enforce adequate rules and
state tort claim that an HMO unreasonably interfered with the decision of medical
practitioners regarding the appropriate medical facility for the treatment of
plaintiff's neurologically emergent condition. Hinterlong v. Dreyer Health Plan,
720 N.E. 2d 315 (I11. Ct. App. 1999) (allegation that MCO was vicariously liable
for its enrolled physicians' failure to timely diagnose, refer or hospitalize
decedent, not preempted under ERISA); Tiemann v. U.S. Healthcare, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 502 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (where MCO acts as arranger of medical
treatment, and not merely in administrative role of determining benefits due and
injury results, claim of medical negligence not preempted under ERISA).
176. See, e.g., Frank M. McClellan, Is Managed Care Good for What Ails
You? Ruminations on Race, Age and Class, 44 VILL. L. REV. 227, 249 (1999)
(stressing that when the impersonal managed care system diminishes the incentive
to deliver care, the legal community must rely on the tort system to protect the
interest of the consumer-patient); see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 407 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(emphasizing the equal role of the judiciary, along with the legislature, in
protecting the welfare of the people).
177. See DiCicco, supra note 2, at 511 (asserting accurately that "[i]n the
interest of encouraging high standards of health care it behooves the Courts to
hold HMOs liable for the conduct of their participating physicians, when the facts
so merit").
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policies to ensure quality care for patients. No reasonable basis exists for
allowing MCOs to escape liability to patients when their actions imperil
patients on the grounds of alleged preemption under ERISA, the
Medicare Act, or considerations of the effect of added litigation expense
on cost containment. The same standard of reasonableness applied to
hospitals by courts under the corporate negligence doctrine should be
applied to the conduct of MCOs. Otherwise, the tort system runs the risk
of undermining its purpose of providing compensation, indemnity or
restitution for harms, and deterring wrongful conduct."' Such a system
also runs the risk of compounding the obligation of hospitals and
physicians in the provision of care to patients. In other words, a hospital
or physician which terminates treatment to a patient based on an MCO's
prospective UR that indicates that further treatment was unwarranted,
risks liability if the denied treatment was medically necessary. However,
the MCO would escape liability by arguing that it did not practice
medicine, 9 and that it was shielded by preemption under ERISA'8s or the
Medicare Act.'8 '
Although the costs and burdens of litigation are legitimate factors to
consider, such considerations should not overshadow the need to ensure
that MCOs act reasonably in their delivery of health care. Common sense
and experience indicate that less litigation would result in the long run if
the threat of tort liability compelled MCOs to act reasonably in medically
related decisions. Attention to reasonable UR, and a dedication to
ensuring the safety and well-being of patients would likely lead to better
care for patients."" This would in turn result in less litigation about alleged
178. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1977), discussed
supra note 171.
179. See, e.g., Williams v. Good Health Plus, 743 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1987);
Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1990).
180. See, e.g., Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1331.
181. See the following cases for the defendants' arguments for preemption
under the Medicare Act: McCall v. Pacificare of Cal., 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784, 789
(Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1999); Plocica v. Nylcare of Tex., 43 F. Supp. 2d 658, 663
(N.D. Tex. 1999); Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 365 (7th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 530
U.S. 211 (2000); Ardary v. Aetna Health Plans of Cal., Inc., 98 F.3d 496, 501 (9th
Cir. 1996). In addition, see the rationales advanced by Judges Easterbrook,
Posner, Flaum, and Wood in their dissenting opinion in Herdrich v. Pegram, 170
F.3d 683 (7th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
182. See Wertheimer, supra note 74, at 127 (observing that the threat of
liability engendered by litigation has resulted in enormous increases in product
safety, especially during the 1990s). There is no reason why the threat of liability
would not encourage MCOs to provide better and safer medical care to their
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substandard care emanating especially from negligent UR. Although
proper UR is absolutely essential to contain the escalating cost of health
care occasioned by new technologies, the aging baby boomers and
increases in life expectancy, UR should not involve only the bottom line.
Patient care should be paramount, or at least enjoy equal consideration
with cost containment in the UR analysis, especially considering the
imbalance between the subscriber and the MCO in the contractual
relationship for the provision of health care.' 3 When there is doubt
whether treatment should be denied, MCOs must err on the side of
approving the treatment. This requirement is especially important since
doctors are better qualified than MCO executives to determine the best
course of treatment for patients.
Courts also have an obligation to use their equity powers to void
unconscionable provisions in MCO contracts such as gag rules"" that may
have the effect of preventing physicians from providing patients with
information regarding alternative options to those approved by the
MCOs. '86 Further, contrary to the laissez-faire approach advocated by187
some, courts have the obligation to impose liability where the acts or
omissions of corporate entities such as MCOs imperil the welfare of
patients,' who are already in an inferior position in the management of
subscribers.
183. See, e.g., McEvoy v. Group Health Coop. of Eau Claire, 570 N.W.2d 397
(Wis. 1997) (upholding application of the tort of bad faith, traditionally applied to
insurance companies, to HMO which breached its contractual obligation to pay up
to the subscriber's policy limit for psychological inpatient care without a
reasonable basis, on the ground, that because "HMO subscribers are in an inferior
position for enforcing their contractual health care rights, application of the tort of
bad faith is an additional means of ensuring that HMOs do not give cost
containment and utilization review such significant weight so as to disregard the
legitimate medical needs of subscribers").
184. Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 377 (appropriately emphasizing that trained
physicians, with inputs from their patients, are best qualified to chart courses of
treatment, and not insurance executives).
185. See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Price, The Evolution of Health Care Decision-
Making: the Political Paradigm and Beyond, 65 TENN. L. REV. 619, 628-30 (1998)
(discussing the effects of gag clauses and attempts to rein them in).
186. For a detailed analysis of the requirements of the informed consent
doctrine, see Emmanuel 0. Iheukwumere, HIV-Positive Medical Practitioners:
Legal and Ethical Obligations to Disclose, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 715 (1997).
187. See, e.g., Herdrich v. Pegram, 170 F.3d 683 (7th Cir. 1999) (dissenting
opinions of Judges Easterbrook, Posner, Flaum, and Wood), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 2143
(2000).
188. See, e.g., Perez v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 1999 N.J. 1000 (N.J. 1999)
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their health care.
CONCLUSION
The MCO system has changed dramatically the way health care is
delivered in the present age. It has also made commendable inroads on
the fight against escalating health care costs mainly through UR
procedures. Notwithstanding the success of the MCO UR in attacking
health care costs, abuses associated with UR have arisen to such an extent
that several states have passed measures to curb managed care excesses.
However, MCOs continue to hide behind arguments premised on alleged
ERISA or Medicare Act preemptions and the alleged non-practice of
medicine when escaping liability for their negligent conduct.
Courts have an obligation to extend the corporate negligence doctrine,
imposed upon hospitals by many of the states, on MCOs to ensure their
compliance with the requirements of reasonable conduct, and thus protect
patients from substandard care and resulting injuries.
(countering argument that the legislature was in a better position to alter the
learned intermediary doctrine when a prescription drug manufacturer markets
directly to the patient with the observation that "[d]efining the scope of tort
liability has traditionally been accepted as the responsibility of the courts"). For a
discussion of the learned intermediary doctrine see Emmanuel 0. Iheukwumere,
Prescription Drugs Liability in Pennsylvania: Is Strict Liability Dead?, 70 PA. B.
ASS'N Q. 135 (1999).
